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INTRODUCTION
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For the purpose of logically and conveniently considering the arguments of the respective parties to this
action, Plaintiffs-Appellants will here reply to the briefs
of Salt Lake County and Gibbons & Reed and answer
the brief of Cross-Appellant the State of Utah under
headings appropriately designating the categories.

PAET 1
REPLY TO CONTENTIONS OF DEFENDANTRESPONDENT SALT LAKE COUNTY
I. Judgment Was Improperly Entered In Favor
Of Salt Lake County.
A. The Jury Is The Judge Of The Weight
Of The Evidence.
The law does not allow the judge to impose his
judgment as to the "weight of the evidence" after a
jury has made that determination. Plaintiffs' argument
is not merely a technical procedural argument. It goes
to the constitutional right of Plaintiffs to have a jury
trial. Rule 50(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure
applies to legal questions, not to the weighing of the
evidence if there is evidence to support the verdict.
The only case cited by Salt Lake County (page 8, Salt
Lake County brief) refers to substantive rights of the
moving party, not to the authority of the judge to
second guess the jury on matters where there is evidence
to support the verdict.

2
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Salt Lake County's Motion for Judgment in its
favor was neither timely nor did it provide a basis of
justification for the trial court's departure from the
jury's verdict. In considering the time at which a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict may be
made under the Federal Rules, 5A Moores Federal Practice H50.10 p. 2362 states as follows:

N
-

Since 1963 the time within which a party who
has moved for a directed verdict at the close of
all the evidence may move to set aside the verdiet or any judgment entered thereon and for
judgment in accordance with his motion for a
directed verdict is 10 days after the entry of
judgment. [Emphasis added.]

The only basis upon which judgment notwithstanding
the verdict may be granted is stated as follows:
Thus, the motion for judgment n.o.v. may be
granted only when, without weighing the credibility of the evidence, there can be but one
reasonable conclusion as to the proper judgment.
•>•' - Where there is conflicting evidence, or there is
insufficient evidence to make a "one way" verdict proper, judgment n.o.v. should not be
awarded. In considering the motion, the court
must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the party who secured the jury verdict
and this approach governs the actions of appellate courts as well as trial courts. Id. H50.07[2]
p. 2356-7.
The federal rule is substantially identical to Eule 50b
of the Utah Eules on this subject. Salt Lake County
has failed to provide legal justification for the trial
court's departure from the jury verdict.
3
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B. The Evidence Does Support The Jury
Findings As To Salt Lake County.
1. Salt Lake County Does Not Deny
That The Natural Drainage Flow
Was Changed.
Salt Lake County admits that the freeway project
changed the natural flow of drainage (Salt Lake County
brief, page 2), but seeks to avoid liability on the ground
that the freeway project was entirely a state project.
The county further contends that permitting the state
to connect its freeway drainage to the county system
did not change the natural flow (Salt Lake County brief,
page 9).
The natural flow was not "already changed" by
the construction of the freeway. The freeway construction plan contemplated the use of the (Salt Lake County
drainage system. Salt Lake County was an accessory
to the plan (E, 1467) (Ex. 7P). It is untenable to assert that the county may agree to the use of its facilities in an overall plan to change the natural flow, and
then contend that it had no part in the change it authorized. The Salt Lake County change in the use of
the drainage system by consent became a part of the
state construction plans to divert the flood waters from
what was their natural course. The county cannot
within extended bounds of reason participate in the
planning and then say it did not do it.
2. Salt Lake County Created A
Drainage System.
There can be no serious contention that Salt Lake
County did not create a drainage system that incor4
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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porated the drainage from the freeway project. The
true situation is not obscured by asserting without evidentiary basis that there would have been more damage
to the residents below Olympus Hills if the change had
not been made. The county had no right or authority to
determine which of its citizens shall receive the flood
damage when it agreed to the change in the flow and
authorized the use of its facilities to affect that change
by exposing citizens of a different location to a new
threat of flood waters; it created a drainage system of
different implications as surely as it changed the flow.
The comparative damage to different sets of citizens is
irrelevant to the issue as to whether a drainage system
was created. In view of all the evidence, the jury found
that Salt Lake County was negligent in failing to provide reasonably adequate drainage facilities for the
highway project and that Plaintiffs suffered damage
as approximate result therefrom (R. 728).
3. Salt Lake County Created A Defective
And Dangerous Condition.
The answers of Salt Lake County to Plaintiffs' summary of factors constituting the defective and dangerous condition created by the county were properly argued before the jury which heard all the evidence. It
can serve no useful purpose in categorically restating
the contentions of the Plaintiffs or refuting the unfounded rebuttal of the county. The weighing of the
evidence is and was left to the jury. The jury concluded
that "Salt Lake County unreasonably created a defective or dangerous condition in the utilization of its
storm drain system" [Finding B ( l ) E, 723].
5
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We agree with Salt Lake County that Gibbons and
Keed had a duty to protect the project during construction, but a contractual agreement between the state and
the contractor regarding assumption of liability during
construction does not relieve the county of the concurrent liability for its part in the creation of a defective
and dangerous condition resulting in the proximate
damage to the Plaintiffs. Plaintiffs are not directly
concerned with the county's right of indemnification
from Gibbons and Eeed or the state. Those matters
are but red herrings in the path of a logical determination of the county's liability in creating a dangerous
and defective condition thus damaging the Plaintiffs'
residences in the county. The statement of counsel that,
"The contractor had the duty under the contract, to
protect the work during construction" and that "that
this was a matter between the state and the contractor
concerning which Salt Lake County had no duty or right
of supervision or control" (Salt Lake County brief,
page 16) seems to be at variance with the views of his
client. The director of the Salt Lake County flood control, Mr. Mackay, at the planning meeting of May 29,
1968, before the project was commenced, stated :
If we can start one and get going — we have
engineering done. We need to tie into 36-inch
line on Wasatch Blvd. which subsequently ties
into our storm sewer. We have three problems:
(1) sudden showers; (2) flood; (3) the public
on our necks. I don't have contractor's schedule.
I would suggest we sit down with the contractor
and schedule it. Upper residential section runoff will create problems. (Ex. 7P, page 5, E. 1751)
6
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,

4. Salt Lake County Was Aware
Of The Danger.
Why counsel claims "the Plaintiffs' contention that
Salt Lake County was fully aware of the possible flooding danger in this case is a misstatement of the evidence" is a little difficult to comprehend, particularly
in view of Mr. Mackay's statement as hereinbefore set
out. Are we expected to conclude that because Appellant flood victims in this action had never sustained
damage in previous floods, it supports the county's contention that it had no knowledge of the flood possibilities? Surely the county has not overlooked the fact
that diverting the waters to a new area exposed a new
group of residents to flood damage they would not
otherwise have suffered. This is one of the hazards
in diverting water from its natural channels. [See 8cmford v. University of Utah, 26 Utah 2d 285, 488 P.2d
741 (1971).] Characterizing a newspaper report of a
matter so public as a flood as "hearsay and highly
prejudicial" does not negate the knowledge that county
government had of the flood occurrence within its
borders. The County's own Master Storm Drain Plan
(Ex. 73P, pp. 1, 2, 11, 44, 78, 79) also clearly outlined
the existence of a severe potential danger and specifically identified the subject area near 4500 South and
Wasatch Boulevard.
Great stress by respondent is placed upon the duty
of Plaintiffs to show Salt Lake County sewer plans
4
'did not meet reasonable engineering standards." (Salt
Lake County brief, pages 15, 18) The evidence is clear
that rainfall nearer the mountains where the flood occurred is much heavier than at the airport or down-
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town Salt Lake. Appellants are criticized because no
suggestion was made as to what data the engineer should
have used, since no other data existed (Salt Lake County
brief, page 15). If the nearest records that had been
kept were in Nevada, would the engineers have been
justified in relying upon the data without making some
allowance or deductions? There is nothing so mystical
in engineering practices that requires engineering testimony to prove that some allowance should have been
made for the heavier rainfall nearer the mountains.
That fact requires no special engineering comprehension. The Salt Lake County flood control director admitted: "We have three problems: (1) sudden showers; (2) flood; (3) the public on our necks." (K, 1751)
But they allowed the state to drain the road project
into the county storm sewer lines. It was the avowed
contention of the county to "sit down with the contractor and schedule it out." (R. 1751) Nevertheless, with
an artificial reservoir created by the partial construction of a new road, protection of exposed areas not
completed, and with no grates to protect the county
sewer system, the contractor and the state were allowed to divert the natural flow to expose the homes
in a new area to floods.
5. The Plaintiffs Were Injured
It was not assumed for the purpose of the trial that
each of the Plaintiffs had been damaged (Salt Lake
County's brief, page 19). The damage was proved as
specifically set out on page 29 of Appellant's brief.
The jury found upon substantial evidence that the Plaintiffs suffered damage as a proximate result of Salt
8
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Lake County's negligence in failing to provide reasonably adequate drainage facilities for the highway project. The extent of the damage was reserved for later
and separate determination pursuant to Rule 42(b).
(R. 59)
C. Salt Lake County Is Not Immune From Suit
Under The Facts of This Case.
Counsel for Salt Lake County has attempted first
to characterize Plaintiffs' claims against the county as
being based solely on negligence, and then to apply
the exception to §63-30-10 (Utah Code Annotated, 1953)
to excuse such negligence. Neither characterization is
supported by either the facts of the case or applicable
law.
As pointed out in Plaintiffs' original brief, the
jury below specifically found that "Salt Lake County
unreasonably created a defective or dangerous condition in the utilization of its storm drain system" and
that this caused damage to all Plaintiffs. (Findings
B ( l ) and (2), R. 723; see also Findings E ( l ) and (2),
R. 727). Such findings come within the waiver of immunity contained in §§63-30-8 and 63-30-9 (Utah Code
Annotated, 1953) as follows:
<
63-30-8. Waiver of immunity for injury
caused by defective, unsafe, or dangerous condition of highways, bridges, or other structures.
— Immunity from suit of all governmental entities is waived for any injury caused by a defective, unsafe, or dangerous condition of any
highway, road, street, alley, crosswalk, sidewalk,
culvert, tunnel, bridge, viaduct or other structure located thereon.
9
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j-.r^

63-30-9. Waiver of immunity for injury
from dangerous or defective public building,
structure, or other public improvement — Exception. — Immunity from suit of all governmental entities is waived for any injury caused
from a dangerous or defective condition of any
public building, structure, dam, reservoir, or
other public improvement. Immunity is not
waived for latent defective conditions.

This Court in Sanford v. University of Utah, 26
Utah 2d 285, 48 P.2d 741 at 745 (1971), in affirming
an award of damages in an analogous governmententity caused flood situation, specifically stated as follows :
Since the waiver of immunity in Sees. 8
[§63-30-8] and 9 [§63-30-9] encompasses a much
broader field of tort liability than merely negligent conduct of employees within the scope of
their employment, the legislature could not have
intended that Sec. 10 [§63-30-10], including its
exceptions, should modify Sees. 8 and 9, even
though it is conceded that the negligent conduct
of an employee might be involved in an action
for injuries caused by the creation or maintenance of a dangerous or defective condition.
Salt Lake County's attempt to characterize the
claims of the Plaintiffs and the findings of the jury as
resting upon negligence only is totally unsupported.
However, the jury also found that the county was,
indeed, negligent. See, Finding 1(1), B. 728. The county's attempt to characterize such negligence as involving a discretionary function is similarly mthout merit.

10
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This court has recognized a set of criteria to be
applied to making a determination as to whether or not
a discretionary function is involved under §63-30-10(1)
(Utah Code Annotated, 1953). In Carroll v. State Road
Commission, 27 Utah 2d 384, 496 P.2d 888 at 891 (1972),
we find the following:
In Johnson v. State, [69 Cal. 2d 782, 73 Cal.
Bptr. 240, 447 P.2d 352 (1968)] the court rejected a literal interpretation of "discretionary"
insofar as that term implied that the mere existence of some alternatives confronting an employee did not compel a holding that the governmental unit thereby attained a status of nonliability. The court stated that these alternatives
may well play a major part in the resolution of
the substantive question of negligence, but they
did not dispose of the threshold question of immunity. The court cited several decisions to
illustrate and reaffirm the principle that although basic policy decisions are allowed immunity, this exception is not extended to the
ministerial implementation of that basic policy.
The court stated that most of the cases involve
failure to warn of foreseeable dangers flowing
from the basic, immune decision. The court further observed that a valid consideration in evaluating a factual situation was whether there was
a reason for sovereign immunity, i.e., did the
employee's decision as to warnings rise to the
level of governmental decisions toward which
judicial restraint should be exercised. [Emphasis
added.]
The jury found that "Salt Lake County was negligent in failing to provide reasonable, adequate drainage facilities for the highway project" (Finding 1(1),
B. 728). The decision of whether to provide drainage
11
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facilities or not may well rest on the discretionary level.
Once, however, that decision is made, the county is required to implement the decision in a " reasonable, adequate" manner. This, the jury specifically found, it
did not do. The county is not immune from the damage "flowing from the immune decision" at the operational level where the decision is implemented. Neither
is there present any valid consideration which would
raise such implementation to the realm where traditional notions of judicial restraint would be appropriate. The "discretionary function" except to the waiver
of immunity for negligent acts has no application to the
case at hand.
Plaintiffs' claims and proof, and the jury's finding, place the liability of the county outside the protection of governmental immunity. The trial court erred
in not entering judgment against Salt Lake County.
II. Plaintiffs Should Recover Tinder The Doctrine
Of Inverse Condemnation.
Plaintiffs-Appellants are fully cognizant of the fact
that the present law of the state, as expressed by this
Court, prevents a recovery upon the ground of inverse
condemnation. But they are also fully aware of the
fact that the majority of states with similar constitutional language have accepted the doctrine as a matter
of justice and right. The trend is clearly in the direction of greater protection for the rights of individuals
who suffer property damage or loss at the hands of
their government. The list of cases incorporated in the
footnote of the initial brief of Appellants at page 36
12
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illustrates the basis for a plea to abandon the ignominious governmental fiction which deprives the citizen
of equitable relief for injury inflicted by the state.
Governmental progress may well demand a new look
at this time for a humanitarian solution for the problem of the unfortunate few who wait in vain for an act
of the legislature.
Article 1, Sec. 22 of the Utah Constitution grants
a right to the people of the state, vis-a-vis, state government and its instrumentalities: "Private property
shall not be taken or damaged for public use without
just compensation." Section 78-3-4 (Utah Code Annotated, 1953) states that, "The district court shall have
original jurisdiction in all matters civil and criminal,
not excepted in the Constitution and not prohibited by
law; * * *." Plaintiffs urge that, in light of 79 years
of inaction by the legislature to provide affirmative relief under Article 1, Sec. 22, it is time for this court to
provide a remedy for the violation of a clearly stated
right of the people of this State. The language and
logic of the U. S. Supreme Court clearly apply to this
situation under Utah law.
Moreover, where federally [State] protected
rights have been invaded, it has been the rule
from the beginning that courts will be alert to
adjust their remedies so as to grant the necessary relief. And it is also well settled that where
legal rights have been invaded, and a federal
[State] statute provides for a general right to
sue for such invasion, federal [State] courts may
use any available remedy to make good the wrong
done. Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 768, 784, 90 L.Ed.
939(1946).
13
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See also, Bivens v. Six Unknown Federal Narcotics
Agents, 403 U.S. 388, 29 L.Ed. 2d 619, 91 S.Ct. 1999
(1971). This court has before it here a clear right under the state constitution and a general state jurisdictional statute. It should exercise its inherent judicial
authority to "make good the wrong done." The recognition and enforcement of constitutional rights is clearly
within the province of this court.
PART 2

ANSWERS TO CONTENTIONS OF DEFENDANTCRQSS-APPELLANT THE STATE OF UTAH
I. The Trial Court Properly Entered Judgment
Against The State Pursuant To The Findings
Of The Jury.
As was the case with regard to the liability of Salt
Lake County, an attempt is made by the State of Utah
to distort the nature of the relief sought against the
state, mischaraeterize the findings of the jury, and misapply the applicable law.
The jury below specifically found that:
The highway project of the State of Utah, including the storm drain system, was unreasonably defective or dangerous.
The improvements and highway project created by the State of Utah was [sic] unreasonably defective or dangerous. [See Findings A and
D,:R. 721, 727.]
The state argues that no liability can rest on such
findings since they do not constitute findings of neg-
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ligence. Again, counsels' attempt to focus attention on
the waiver of immunity and exceptions for negligence
contained in §63-30-10 (Utah Code Annotated, 1953)
while ignoring the specific language of §§63-30-8 and
63-30-9, quoted supra, is indeed misleading.
This Court has specifically addressed this issue in
Sanford v. University of Utah, supra. In that case,
this court characterized a flood situation as a case
sounding in nuisance, affirming an award of damages
to the flood victim. The defendant in the Sanford case
urged an appeal, as the state does here, as follows:
On appeal, defendant urges that Sec, 10 of
the [Governmental Immunity] Act modifies Sees.
8 and 9, and that under the Act, a governmental
entity is not liable for a dangerous or defective
condition causing injury, unless the condition
was caused by a negligent act or omission of
an employee committed within the scope of his
employment. 488 P.2d at 742.
In rejecting this claim, this Court held as follows:
A survey of the statutory scheme in the Governmental Immunity Act reveals that in Sees. 7
and 10 of the legislature waived immunity in
regard to a particular type of tortious conduct
by a particular class of people, namely, negligent acts or omissions by employees while in
the scope of employment. In contrast, in Sees.
8 and 9, the legislature waived immunity in regard to certain interests invaded or harm or
damages inflicted without reference to the type
of conduct which earned the invasion. Sec.
63-30-2(6) provides:
15
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The word "injury"
jury to a person, damage
erty, or any other injury
suffer to his person, or
be actionable if inflicted
son or his agent.
?;

means death, into or loss of propthat a person may
estate, that would
by a private per-

This broad definition of injury when construed in connection with the language of Sec. 9
indicates a legislative intent to include within
the waiver of immunity an action for private
nuisance insofar as the action is predicated on
a dangerous or defective condition of a public
improvement that unreasonably interferes with
the use and enjoyment of the claimant's property.
Since the waiver of immunity in Sees. 8 and
9 encompasses a much broader field of tort lia^
bility than merely negligent conduct of employees within the scope of their employment, the
legislature could not have intended that Sec. 10,
including its exceptions, should modify Sees. 8
and 9, even though it be conceded that the negligent conduct of an employee might be involved
in an action for injuries caused by the creation
or maintenance of a dangerous or defective condition. 488 P.2d at 745. [Emphasis added.}

The state's attempt to focus only on the planning
and inspection of the highway project as the basis for
the finding against the state is again misleading. As
quoted above, the Utah statutes specifically waive immunity for injury caused by dangerous or defective
conditions in public improvements, and the jury below
specifically found the existence of such conditions. Analogy to the Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C.A.
§2671, et seq., and cases arising thereunder, (e.g., Sisley
16
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v. United States, 202 F. Supp, 273 (D. Alaska, 1962),
cited in the state's brief at pp. 28-29) is not enlightening. Indeed, the federal act has no provisions analogous to §§63-30-8 and 63-30-9. The holding from the
Sisley case cited in the state's brief would in effect
emasculate §§63-30-8 and 63-30-9 if applied under Utah
law. It would, if applied, exempt the state from liability anytime it implements one of its discretionary decisions (e.g., to build a road) in a dangerous or defective manner. The plain language of the statute and the
holdings of this court (see, e.g., Carroll v. State, supra)
clearly reject such a result.
The findings of the jury below are consistent with
both the facts and the law, and the judgment of liability
as to the state should be affirmed, the state having
waived its immunity in such a case.

II.

The Court Erred In Not Entering Judgment
For Indemnity Against Gibbons & Reed
Company

We agree with counsel for the State of Utah that
Gibbons & Reed Company had control of the instrumentality causing the damage and was guilty of primary negligence. ((State of Utah brief, page 32). The
jury found that " Gibbons & Reed Company was negligent in that it failed to take reasonable precautions to
protect the project during construction." The jury further found that this negligence proximately caused damage to Plaintiffs [Findings J ( l ) , K, (Record 728)].
Gibbons & Reed clearly agreed to indemnify and hold
17
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harmless the state for all suits for damages on account
of the operations of the contractor or on account of or
in consequence of any neglect in safeguarding the work.
Under its contract with the state, the order and sequence of construction and the protection of the project
during construction were matters undertaken by Gibbons
& Reed Company.
PART 3
REPLY TO CONTENTION? OF DEFENDANTRESPONDENT GIBBONS & REED
I. Defendant Gibbons & Reed Does Not Apply
The Proper Legal Standard In Answering
Appellants' Arguments.
In responding to Appellants' brief, Defendant Gibbons & Reed assumes that it is with the province of a
reviewing court (and the trial judge) to reweigh the
evidence presented to the jury at trial after the jury
has made specific findings with respect to that evidence. Such an assumption is unwarranted and, in fact,
conflicts with the appropriate legal standard for review which requires examination of the evidence in
the light most favorable to the party for whom the jury
found. See e.g. Porter v. Price, 11 Utah 2d 80, 355 P.2d
at 66 at 67 (1960). This court has stated that, " I t is
the declared policy of this court to zealously protect the
right of trial by jury and not to take issues from them
and rule as a matter of law except in clear cases."
Webb v. Olin Matheson Chemical Corporation, 9 Utah
2d 275, 342 P.2d 1094 at 1101 (1959).
18
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Thus, Gibbons & Reed's argument is misdirected
when it states at page 3 of its brief, There is, in fact, almost a total disregard of any
facts which favor Gibbons & Reed and support
the actions of the trial court.
Contrary to the implications of the foregoing assertion,
the test to be applied on review is not what evidence
favored Gibbons & Reed, but rather whether evidence
exists which, when viewed most favorably with respect
to Plaintiffs, would justify the jury's findings that Gibbons & Reed negligently failed to protect the project
during construction causing damage to the Plaintiffs.
The duty of Appellants was to call to the attention of
this court the facts which amply support the findings
of the jury.
That evidence which supports the jury's finding
includes the following matters: (1) During construction
Gibbons & Reed took no action to prevent rocks, and
other debris from clogging the storm drains through the
use of temporary (or permanent) protective drains.
(2) During construction, Gibbons & Reed failed to ensure that storm drains were open and free flowing to
accommodate large quantities of runoff water.* (3) During construction, Gibbons & Reed removed a curb along
Wasatch Boulevard and failed to replace it, thus permitting runoff waters from the higher east ground to
cascade unchecked onto the freeway. (4) Gibbons & Reed
*The only effort Gibbons & Reed claimed to have made in this
regard was to observe that some water could flow through the drains.
No effort was made to make certain that rocks and debris had not
accumulated during the construction project in the storm drain system
within the project.
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failed to install concrete ditch liners or temporary devices to retard erosion in the barrow pits. (5) Gibbons
& Eeed failed to take any measures to control erosion
of cut banks. (6) Gibbons & Eeed failed to utilize ditch
riders or other means to ensure that drains remained
free-flowing during storms.
Plaintiffs do not deny that Gibbons & Eeed attempted to explain away the foregoing omissions and
failures. The company presented rebuttal testimony on
some of those points and made the same arguments to
the jury which are made in its brief to this court. Notwithstanding those arguments and the counter evidence,
the jury found that Gibbons & Eeed had negligently
failed to protect the project and that the Plaintiffs were
damaged thereby. Thus, it must be concluded that the
jury weighed the evidence, evaluated the arguments,
and found against Gibbons & Eeed on this issue. The
arguments and explanations again propounded by Gibbons & Eeed constitute merely an attempt to persuade
this court to reweigh the evidence. Such an attempt is
improper on appellate review.
II. The Jury Properly Held That Gibbons & Eeed
' Negligently Caused Damage to Plaintiffs.
Gibbons & Eeed asserts at page 11 of its brief that
it cannot be held responsible for its negligence when
it is performing work for a governmental authority
pursuant to plans and specifications furnished by a public employer. The cases cited by Gibbons & Eeed, however, do not support that proposition and are not applicable to the facts of the present situation.
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As Plaintiffs stated in their brief at page 34, there
is no dispute that the jury found that Gibbons & Reed
followed the state's plans. It is in the area of the exercise of independent discretion as to the protection of
the project during construction that the jury found
Gibbons & Reed lacking in proper care. None of the
cases cited by Gibbons & Reed involves negligence by
the contractor in performing discretionary matters.
While it may be arguable that Gibbons & Reed performed its work in conformity with plans and specifications, it is equally true that Gibbons & Reed did not
protect the project. The contractor took its chances
when it removed the curbing from Wasatch Boulevard
which allowed the flood waters above the project to
drain into the new road; when it deferred protection
of its cuts and fills; and when it neither determined
the conditions of the storm sewer nor protected the inlets to the storm sewer. Had the flood come when these
conditions had been remedied, the result would have
been different. Although floods were to be expected,
the contractor lost its gamble because it did not anticipate the timing of the flood.
III. The Trial Court Disregarded The Jury's
Findings.
Gibbons & Reed points out that the jury resolved
several issues in its favor. However, its brief totally
fails to reconcile its argument with the fact that the
jury also found one critical issue contrary to Gibbons
& Reed's position and also disregards the fact that the
trial court inexplicably disregarded that finding. Con21
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trary to Respondent's contention, Plaintiffs did not attempt to ignore the fact that the jury found some issues in favor of Gibbons & Reed. That matter was expressly dealt with at page 34 of Plaintiffs' brief.
It is irrelevant for the purposes of this appeal that
the jury found any issues in favor of Gibbons & Reed,
provided that the issue found against Gibbons & Reed
is consistent with the other findings, which it is. Thus,
Gibbons & Reed's emphasis on the favorable aspects of
the jury's findings, while interesting, does not in any
way affect the fact that the jury also found negligence
on a crucial item causing proximate damage to Plaintiffs.
The jury's finding against Gibbons & Reed clearly
provided the basis for a judgment against Gibbons &
Reed. Nevertheless, without motion for judgment n.o.v.,
the trial court failed to enter such judgment. As with
the trial court's failure to enter judgment against the
county, the failure to follow the jury's findings in the
face of ample supporting evidence in effect deprives
the Plaintiffs of their right to a jury trial. Such action
of the trial court should not be permitted to stand.
IV. Substantial Evidence Supported The Jury's
Findings.
' P l a i n t i f f s ' opening brief discusses the evidence
which supports the jury's findings. It is unnecessary
to repeat that information here. But it may be helpful
to reply to several arguments advanced by Gibbons &
Reed.
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First, it is incorrectly stated iiuu "!*.«- <n\\y pos
sible evidence in ilii> regard related w> ihe drainage
system and I at k <*f grates" (Gibbons & Reed brief, page
23). Tln> *Mi-ci matters of evidence were discnssed in
Plaintiffs' opening brief and also have been repeated
somewhat above. Suffice it to say at this point that
several other grounds exist in addition to the lack of
protective grating.
'
Second, despite Gibbons & Reed's assertion at page
23 of its brief, the finding of negligence does not have
to relate to something other than proper drainage. The
jury conld have found either that Gibbons & Reed was
not responsible to provide the proper drainage or ii*at
Gibbons & Reed properly constructed Hu- drainage system, and therefore Gibbons & Reed did not fail 1o pro
vide a proper drainage system. Even if the jury found
this, it could (and did) also find that Gibbons & Reed
negligently failed to protect that system during the construction project. Thus, the jury's finding in paragraph
J ( l ) (R. 728) could have related to the drainage problem.
Third, Gibbons & Reed was certainly on imih= of
Plaintiffs' claim in that it was specifically alleged thai.
Gibbons & Reed negligently went beyond iho plans and
specifications, negligently departed from ihe plans and
specifications, negligently collected and concentrated
flood waters in unnatural channels, and negligently
failed to inspect and maintain during construction the
storm sewer line. Those allegations were broad in scope
and included all of the items of evidence against Gib-
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bons & Beed. See Plaintiffs' Complaint. Of course, if
Gibbons & Beed believed that evidence went beyond the
complaint, then the time for objection was at trial, not
on appeal.
Fourth, it is suggested that because the state requested the interrogatory on which the jury ruled
against Gibbons & Beed, somehow the jury's ruling is
invalid. This suggestion is totally unsupported by any
logic or case law. The interrogatory speaks for itself
and asks the important follow-up question of whether
Gibbons & Beed's negligence proximately injured
Plaintiffs, not the state. The jury answered affirmatively, directly linking Gibbons & Beed's negligence with
the Plaintiffs' injury.
Fifth, Gibbons & Beed incorrectly asserts that the
removal of the protective curbing or dike along old
Wasatch Boulevard and the failure to install the new
curbing was not negligence, but merely following "normal sequencing." Evidence was presented on both sides
of this question, including the fact that in past years
the protective curbing had, in fact, channeled waters
away from the Plaintiffs even in very heavy downpours. All of that evidence, plus the numerous photographs, were evaluated by the jury and the jury found
against Gibbons & Beed.
Sixth, concerning Gibbons & Beed's contention regarding concrete barrow-pit liners, Plaintiffs proved
that there would be substantial erosion if no protective liners were in place. Gibbons & Beed admitted
U
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that the issue of the sequence of placing ditch liiuM'.s
was a matter of contract discretion. The jw\ w i \
probably concluded thai tho ditch liners should have
received highest priority In view of t\w potential probW . The same is true with the other protective nu*a*urcs which Gibbon« ft "Rood failed to take.
Seventh, despite the overwhelming weight of substantial evidence, Gibbons & Reed still argues > o ^
brief, page 26) \Uu\ ilu» project \\i\> m»| "..• .. vuinrraM- position ni ihc iim«» of ill*1 :'!MO,J simply because
the drain system had *T< IS connected. It ignores the
following facts: denuded cut banks and slopes, unlined
barrow pits, no protective grates, no protective curbing, the high potential of torrential cloudbursts in
August and specifically along the Wasatch front, nul
uninspected storm drains. 1 K- J.,I\ bviously did *mi
ignore the vulnerability issue. This argument -f t In*
weight of the evidence at the appellate stage, as already
stated, is untimely.
V

No Other Legal Principles Support The
Trial Court's Action.

The cases and "principles" cited by Gibbons &
Reed at the conclusion of its brief do not support the
trial court's unexplained and unsupported disregard of
the jury's findings.
For example, Gibbons & Reed cites a 1964 Kansas
case (Knape i\ TAvmg$ton Oil Co., 392 P.2d 842) for
the propositi^ -'int where answers to in terrogatories
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conflict, specific answers are given weight over conclusory answers. The Knape case is inapplicable here
because there has been no showing that the jury's answers in any way conflict. As stated above, Plaintiffs
contend that the subject answers are, in fact, consistent.
Moreover, the finding of the jury in question [ J ( l ) ]
is not conclusory. When read in light of the lengthy
instructions on negligence and the duty of Gibbons &
Eeed as a contractor, the jury's finding is clear and
specific. *
In addition, courts have held that where different
inferences as to the negligence of a party may reasonably be drawn, the determination thereof is within the
province of the jury. See, e.g., Cleveland, C, C. &
S. L. R. Co. v. Moneyhun, 146 Ind. 147, 44 N.E. 1106
(1896). In such cases, it is not error to require the
jury to make a finding on negligence of one party with
respect to certain matters in issue. This is exactly what
the trial court permitted the jury to do in this case.
The instructions to the jury in this case expressly
required the jury to make certain findings to support
its answers to the interrogatories. The interrogatory
answer itself was specific with respect to the issue involved (protecting the project). Hence, the finding was
not merely a conclusion of law, but was a proper inference to be found by the jury. The cases of Gilford
v. Strohecker, 150 F. Supp. 655 (N.D. Ohio 1956), and
Zieglasch v. Durr, 326 P.2d 295 (Kan. 1958), relate to
conclusory answers without supporting facts and are
thus inapplicable. No Utah case even remotely suggests
26
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flm^ ^ e j. u r yj g a i l g w e r g gj10„ujc| ^ e disregarded on the
ground urged by Gibbons & Eeed. Plaintiffs contend
that Utah law should i***t u> developed at .» is p:»mt in
achieve a result which in H'lVd druies a party its right
to a jury trial.
Tin- -uses of Monsou i\ lhqn; 2W P.2d 580 (Kan.
1956), ;u.d /Mn . Henderson, 483 l\Jd 1 089 (Kan.
1971), an ;»!-<» hM applicable here because both are
based on facts where the jury's findings were inconsistent. Tliat iv4 not the case here.
Finally, Rule 49(a) does not give tin ' n-d ••<nui
latitude to make findings inconsistent will' issues found
by the jury. The ability to add does not include the
ability to contradict. This is the principle of First
Security Bank of Utah, N.A.
I nvriahl, 22 Utah 2d
433,455 P.2d 88fi (196P"«
Contrary t<> <Jil>bons & "RIMMPS misleading asseri ]«• i s ai pauv ;>0 id' its brief, i h * - trial -ourt made absolutely im finding that Interrogatory J ( l ) was submitted in error. On the contrary, the trial court made
no explanation whatsoever of its action. It simply and
erroneously disregarded a clear and substantial jury
finding against Gibbons & Reed.
CONCLUSION
The liability of the Siat«« <d' \'\nU nr.A Sail L<d<<*
County has been determiner! l.\ \\u> jurv within tin* immunity waiver provisions sei \>\ \\\*> legislature Tin*
jury has also round that Gibbons \ lu^d Company in
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violation of its contractual obligation, failed to protect
its construction project to the damage of the PlaintiffsAppellants. If it is possible that a trial judge under
the circumstances of this case may allow the injured
parties to pass without a remedy, trial by jury will be
a delusion and a mockery.
DATED: MAY.1,1975.
Respectfully submitted,
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JOHN S. BOYDEN
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